


ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE: A New Synthesis



Nils J. Nilsson

Artificial Intelligence

A New Synthesis

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Artificial Intelligence

A New Synthesis



Nils J. Nilsson

Stanford University



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For Scott and Ryan

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Preface

This introductory textbook employs a novel perspective from which to view topics in artificial intelligence (AI). I will consider a progression of AI systems or “agents,” each slightly more complex than its predecessor. I begin with elementary agents that react to sensed properties of their environments. Even such simple machines allow me to treat topics in machine vision, machine learning, and machine evolution. Then, by stages, I introduce techniques that allow agents to exploit information about the task environment that cannot be immediately sensed. Such knowledge can take the form of descriptive information about the state of the environment, iconic models of the environment, state-space graphs, and logical representations. Because the progression follows what plausibly might have been milestones in the evolution of animals, I have called this approach *evolutionary artificial intelligence*. I intend the book to be as much a proposal about how to think about AI as it is a description of AI techniques. Examples will be used to provide motivation and grounding.

Although I use agents to motivate and illustrate AI techniques, the techniques themselves have much broader application. Many ideas invented by AI researchers have been assimilated into computer science generally for applications in expert systems, natural language processing, human-machine interaction, information retrieval, graphics and image processing, data mining, and robotics (to name some examples). The agents theme serves to unify what might otherwise seem to be a collection of disparate topics.

Regarding coverage, my intention is to treat the middle ground between theory and applications. This middle ground is rich in important AI *ideas*, and in this book I try to motivate and explain the ideas that I think have lasting value in AI. (Being subject to the usual human frailties, I admit to possible errors of omission

and commission in selecting topics for inclusion.) Also, some subjects are treated in more depth than others—both because I thought some subjects more important and because I wanted to provide at least some examples of greater depth of exposition. Although some pseudocode algorithms are presented, the book is not an AI programming and implementation book. (Some “AI techniques” books are [Shoham 1994, Norvig 1992, Tracy & Bouthoorn 1997].) I do not give proofs of all of the important theoretical results, but I try to give intuitive arguments and citations to formal proofs. My goals are to present a modest-sized textbook for a one-semester introductory college course, to give the student and reader sufficient motivation and preparation to go on to more advanced AI courses, and to make the extensive literature on AI accessible.

A somewhat unconventional feature of the book is that machine learning is not treated as a separate topic; instead, various aspects of learning arise throughout the book. Neural nets and fundamental ideas about supervised learning are presented early; techniques for learning search heuristics and action policies are discussed in the chapters on search; rule learning, inductive logic programming, and explanation-based learning are treated toward the end of the chapters on logic; and learning plans is presented after discussing logic-based planning.

In my previous books, I included a “bibliographic and historical remarks” section at the end of each chapter. (Some readers may find those sections of some interest still.) I have not done so in the present book, both because AI history has now accumulated to such a great extent and because the longer text by [Russell & Norvig 1995] has already done such a thorough job in that regard. Instead, I include remarks and citations as appropriate throughout the text and provide some additional ones in discussion sections at the end of most chapters. The serious student who intends to specialize in AI research will want to consult many of the references. I hope the casual reader is not bothered by the many citations.

Sample exercises are included at the end of each chapter. They vary in difficulty from routine application of ideas presented in the book to mildly challenging. I expect that instructors will want to augment these problems with favorite ones of their own, including computer exercises and projects. (In keeping with my decision to concentrate on ideas instead of programs, I have not included any computer exercises or projects. Several good programming and project ideas can be found in texts devoted to AI programming techniques.)

The following typographical conventions are used in this book. Sans serif font is used for the names of actions and for “proto-English” sentences communicated among agents. SANS SERIF capitals are used for the names of computer languages, algorithms, and AI systems. Boldface capital letters, such as **W** and **X**, are used for vectors, matrices, and modal operators. Typewriter font is used for genetic programs, for expressions and subexpressions in the predicate calculus, and for

STRIPS rules and operators. Lowercase Greek letters are used for metavariables ranging over predicate-calculus expressions, subexpressions, and occasionally for substitutions. Uppercase Greek letters are used to denote sets of predicate-calculus formulas. Lowercase p 's are used to denote probabilities.

Students and researchers will find much helpful material about AI on the World Wide Web. I do not provide URLs here; any list written today would be incomplete and inaccurate within months. Use of one of the web search engines will quickly steer the reader to sites with sample applications, frequently asked questions, extensive bibliographies, research papers, programs, interactive demonstrations, announcements of workshops and conferences, homepages of researchers, and much more.

Material specifically in support of this book is provided on a Web page on the publisher's Web site at www.mkp.com/nils. If you discover any errors, please email them to the publisher at aibugs@mkp.com. Errata and clarifications can be found at <http://www.mkp.com/nils/clarified>.

My previous AI textbook, *Principles of Artificial Intelligence* (Morgan Kaufmann, 1980), is by now quite out of date, but some of the material in that book is still useful, and I have borrowed freely from it in preparing the present volume. Cross-checking against other AI textbooks (particularly [Russell & Norvig 1995, Rich & Knight 1991, Stefik 1995]) was also very helpful.

Students and teaching assistants in my Stanford courses on artificial intelligence and machine learning have already made several useful suggestions. I hope the following list includes most of them: Eyal Amir, David Andre, Scott Benson, George John, Steve Ketchpel, Ron Kohavi, Andrew Kosoresow, Ofer Matan, Karl Pflieger, and Charles Richards. Colleagues and reviewers at Stanford and elsewhere helped me learn what they already knew. Thanks to Helder Coelho, Oscar Firschein, Carolyn Hayes, Giorgio Ingargiola, Leslie Kaelbling, Daphne Koller, John Koza, Richard Korf, Pat Langley, John McCarthy, Bart Selman, Yoav Shoham, Devika Subramanian, Gheorghe Tecuci, and Michael Wellman. Special thanks go to Cheri Palmer, my production editor at Morgan Kaufmann, who kept me on schedule, cheerfully accepted my endless changes, and worked extra hard to meet a difficult publication date. Work on this book was carried on in the Robotics Laboratory of Stanford's Department of Computer Science and at the Santa Fe Institute. Continuing research support by the National Science Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.

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1

Introduction

I believe that understanding intelligence involves understanding how knowledge is acquired, represented, and stored; how intelligent behavior is generated and learned; how motives, and emotions, and priorities are developed and used; how sensory signals are transformed into symbols; how symbols are manipulated to perform logic, to reason about the past, and plan for the future; and how the mechanisms of intelligence produce the phenomena of illusion, belief, hope, fear, and dreams—and yes even kindness and love. To understand these functions at a fundamental level, I believe, would be a scientific achievement on the scale of nuclear physics, relativity, and molecular genetics.

—James Albus, Response to Henry Hexmoor, from URL:

<http://tommy.jsc.nasa.gov/er/er6/mrl/papers/symposium/albus.txt>

February 13, 1995

1.1

What Is AI?

Artificial Intelligence (AI), broadly (and somewhat circularly) defined, is concerned with intelligent behavior in artifacts. Intelligent behavior, in turn, involves perception, reasoning, learning, communicating, and acting in complex environments. AI has as one of its long-term goals the development of machines that can do these things as well as humans can, or possibly even better. Another goal

of AI is to understand this kind of behavior whether it occurs in machines or in humans or other animals. Thus, AI has both engineering and scientific goals. In this book, I will largely be concerned with AI as engineering, focussing on the important concepts and ideas underlying the design of intelligent machines.

AI has always been surrounded by controversy. The question *Can machines think?* has interested philosophers as well as scientists and engineers. In a famous article, Alan Turing, one of the founders of computer science, rephrased that question in terms more amenable to an empirical test, which has come to be called the *Turing test* [Turing 1950]. I will describe that test shortly, but Turing also noted that the answer to the question “Can machines think?” depends on how we define the words *machine* and *think*. He might also have added that it depends on how we define *can*.

Let’s consider the word *can* first. Do we mean can machines think someday or can they now? Do we mean that in principle they might be able to think (even if we could never build ones that do), or are we asking for an actual demonstration? These are important questions since no artifact yet possesses broad thinking skills.

Some people believe that thinking machines might have to be so complex and have such complex experiences (interacting with their environment and with other thinking machines, for example) that we could never actually design or build them. The processes that generate global weather provide a good analogy. Even if we knew everything of importance about the weather, that knowledge wouldn’t necessarily allow us to duplicate weather phenomena artificially in all of its richness. No system less complex than the actual earth’s surface, atmosphere, and seas—embedded in space, warmed by the sun, and influenced by the tides—would be able to duplicate weather phenomena in all of their details. Similarly, full-scale, human-level intelligence may be too complex, or at least too dependent on the precise physiology of humans, to exist apart from its *embodiment* in humans situated in their environment. (For a discussion of the importance of this notion of embodiment see, for example, [Lakoff 1987, Winograd & Flores 1986, Harnad 1990, Mataric 1997].) The matter of whether or not we could ever build human-level thinking machines is still undecided, and AI progress toward that goal has been steady, albeit slower than some early pioneers predicted. I am optimistic about our eventual success.

Next, we come to the word *machine*. To many people, a machine is a rather stolid thing. The word evokes images of gears grinding, steam hissing, and steel parts clanking. How could such a thing think? Nowadays, however, the computer has greatly expanded our notion of what a machine can be. Our growing understanding of biological mechanisms is expanding it even further. Consider, for example, the simple virus called *E6 Bacteriophage* shown schematically in Figure 1.1. Its head contains viral DNA. The virus attaches itself to the cell wall of a bacterium with its tail fibers, punctures the wall, and squirts its DNA into the bacterium. The DNA then directs the bacterium to manufacture thousands of




Figure 1.1

Schematic Illustration of E6 Bacteriophage

copies of all of the viral parts. These parts then automatically assemble themselves into new viruses that explode out of the bacterium to repeat the process. The complete assembly looks and operates very much like a machine, and we might as well call it a machine—one made of proteins.

What about other biological processes and organisms? The complete genome of the bacterium *Haemophilus influenzae* Rd has recently been sequenced [Fleischmann, et al. 1995]. This genome has 1,830,137 base pairs (consisting of the “letters” A, G, C, and T). That’s roughly 3.6×10^6 bits or one-half a megabyte. Although the function of all of its 1743 genes is not yet known, scientists are beginning to explain the development and functioning of such organisms in the same way that they would explain machines—very complex machines, of course. In fact, techniques quite familiar to computer scientists, namely, the use of timing diagrams for logic circuits, are proving useful for understanding the regulation by genes of the complex biochemistry of a bacteria-infecting virus [McAdams & Shapiro 1995]. Sequencing the complete genomes of other organisms, including humans, is proceeding. Once we know these “blueprints,” will we think of these organisms—bacteria, worms, fruit flies, mice, dolphins, humans—as machines? If humans are machines, then machines *can* think! We have an existence proof. We “simply” don’t know yet how the human machine works.

Yet, even should we agree about what a machine is, there are some additional twists to this argument. Even if machines made of proteins can think, perhaps ones made of silicon wouldn’t be able to. A well-known philosopher, John Searle,

believes that what we are made of is fundamental to our intelligence [Searle 1980, Searle 1992]. For him, thinking can occur only in very special machines—living ones made of proteins.

Directly opposed to Searle's belief (and to the notion of embodiment mentioned earlier) is the *physical symbol system hypothesis* of Newell and Simon [Newell & Simon 1976]. That hypothesis states that a physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient means for general intelligent action. According to Newell and Simon, a physical symbol system is a machine, like a digital computer, that is capable of manipulating symbolic data—adding numbers, rearranging lists of symbols (such as alphabetizing a list of names), replacing some symbols by others, and so on. An important aspect of this hypothesis is that it doesn't matter what the physical symbol system is made of! Newell and Simon's hypothesis is "substrate neutral." An intelligent entity could be made of protein, mechanical relays, transistors, or anything else, so long as it can process symbols.¹

Still others believe that it isn't whether or not machines are made of silicon or protein that is important; these people think that much intelligent behavior is the result of what they call *subsymbolic* processing—processing of *signals*, not symbols. Take the recognition of familiar faces, for example. Humans do that effortlessly, and although we don't know how they do it, it is suspected that the best explanation for the process would involve treating images or parts of them as multidimensional signals, not as symbols.

I could list many other points of view about what sorts of machines might be capable of humanlike thought. Some of the claims one often hears are

- The brain processes information in parallel, whereas conventional computers do it serially. We'll have to build new varieties of parallel computers to make progress in AI.
- Conventional computing machinery is based on true-or-false (binary) logic. Truly intelligent systems will have to use some sort of "fuzzy" logic.
- Animal neurons are much more complex than switches—the basic building blocks of computers. We'll need to use quite realistic artificial neurons in intelligent machines.

Perhaps it is still too early for the field of AI to reach a consensus about what sort of machinery is required, although many AI researchers accept the physical symbol system hypothesis.

Finally, we come to the most difficult word, *think*. Rather than attempt to define this word, Turing proposed a test, the Turing test, by which it could be

1. Of course, some building materials will be better than others if we take into account such practical matters as speed, permanence, reliability, suitability for parallel processing, temperature sensitivity, and so on.